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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Section 78-2-2(3)(a) of the Utah Code.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Whether the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a)
(hereinafter, "Subsection 4(a)") apply to counterclaims. (Order of the Supreme Court of
State of Utah, dated May 19, 2006, granting certiorari). This issue presents a matter of
statutory interpretation, which is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See
e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, \ 17, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203.
Issue No, 2: Whether the requirements of Subsection 4(a) apply regardless of the
availability of remedies to a property owner under the Residence Lien Restriction and
Lien Recovery Fund Act. (Order of the Supreme Court of State of Utah, dated May 19,
2006, granting certiorari). This issue also is one of statutory interpretation which is
reviewed for correctness. Rushton, 1999 UT 36,1f 37, 977 P.2d at 1203.]

This Court granted certiorari on the original petition that was first filed by Appellant
Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction ("Hart") as to the two above-listed issues. The Court
also stated that certiorari was granted on the cross-petition that was later-filed by
Appellee Joel Sill ("Sill") as to the issue of whether Subsection 4(a) creates a
jurisdictional bar. Pursuant to Rules 51(b)(4) and 24(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Hart expressly reserves all rights to fully brief and address the merits of Sill's
arguments regarding the claimed "jurisdictional" nature of Subsection 4(a) after such
arguments have first been briefed by Sill for presentation to the Court. Hart notes,
however, that the Court need not even reach any analysis as to whether Subsection 4(a) is
jurisdictional, since on its face Subsection 4(a) does not apply to this case to begin with,
as discussed more fully in this brief.

CONTROLLING STATUTES
The following controlling statutes are applicable to this appeal:2
Utah Code § 38-l-ll(4)(a) (2001): [Mechanics' Liens] Enforcement -Time for -Lis
pendens -Action for debt not affected -Instructions and form affidavit and motion.
(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter
involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien claimant shall
include with the service of the complaint on the owner of the residence:
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's
rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and
Lien Recovery Fund Act; and
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the
owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner
may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. (Emphasis added).

Utah Code § 38-11-107 (2001): [Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund
Act] Restrictions upon maintaining a lien against residence or owner's interest in
the residence.
(1) A person qualified to file a lien upon an owner-occupied residence and the
real property associated with that residence under the provisions of Title 38,
Chapter 1, Mechanics'Liens, who provides qualified services under an
agreement effective on or after January 1, 1995, other than directly with the
owner, shall be barred after January 1, 1995, from maintaining a lien upon that
residence and real property or recovering a judgment in any civil action against
the owner or the owner-occupied residence to recover monies owed for
qualified services provided by that person if: . . . . (Emphasis added).

2

The statutes determinative of this case that are therefore cited in this brief are those that
were in place when Hart filed his answer and counterclaim in February of 2002.

Utah Code § 38-11-204 (2001): [Residence Lien Restriction and Lien
Recovery Fund Act] Claims against the fund -Requirement to make a
claim -- Qualifications to receive compensation,
(3) To recover from the [Residential Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery
F]und5 regardless of whether the residence is occupied by the owner, a
subsequent owner, or the owner or subsequent owner's tenant or lessee, a
qualified beneficiary shall establish that:

(b) the owner has paid in full the original contractor, licensed or
exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction
Trades Licensing Act, real estate developer, or factory built housing
retailer under Subsection (3)(a) with whom the owner has a written
contract in accordance with the written contract and any
amendments to the contract, and: . . . . (Emphasis added).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This action was filed by Plaintiff Joel Sill ("Sill"), who served a complaint upon

Defendant Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction ("Hart") relating to the parties' agreement
for the construction by Hart of improvements to real property owned by Sill. Hart then
filed with the district court and served upon Sill's attorneys an answer that also included
a counterclaim (the "Counterclaim") in which Hart sought, among other things, to
foreclose a mechanics' lien securing payment from Sill for the improvements Hart made
to Sill's property.
After two and a half years of litigation and discovery, in the week just before the
start of trial, Sill for the first time raised to Hart an argument that Hart's mechanics' lien
foreclosure claim was defective because Hart had not served upon Sill a form affidavit

and motion for summary judgment, and instructions for use of those forms in exercise of
certain rights available to some homeowners under Utah's Residence Lien Restriction
and Lien Recovery Fund Act (Utah Code §§ 38-11-101 e/ seq. - hereinafter, the
"LRFA"). Sill argued that service of such LRFA instructions and forms was required of
Hart by Utah Code section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (identified and referred to above, and
hereinafter, as "Subsection 4(a)") of Utah's mechanics' lien statutes (Utah Code §§38-

1-1 etseq).
The case proceeded to trial The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hart, awarding
him the full principal amount of $314,500.00 that he requested on his unjust enrichment
and mechanics' lien claims. Hart also ultimately was awarded an additional $303,305.55
in attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest.
When Hart attempted to reduce the jury's verdict to a judgment, Sill opposed that
effort by arguing that attorney fees and prejudgment interest were not recoverable from
him, and that Hart's mechanics' lien could not be foreclosed because Sill had not been
served with LRFA instructions and forms when Hart served his Counterclaim on Sill's
attorneys, which Sill claimed was required by Subsection 4(a). Sill did not object to the
amount of fees and interest.
After extensive briefing and oral argument by the parties, the district court issued a
well-reasoned "Memorandum Decision" (the "Decision") rejecting Sill's Subsection 4(a)
arguments and declaring:
The plain language of Subsection (4) compels the conclusion that the Utah
Legislature limited the obligation of a lien claimant to serve a homeowner
with the materials referenced in Subsection (4)(a) to those instances in
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which the lien claimant was initiating an action through service of a
complaint and not a counterclaim. First, while "[t]he word 'action'
without more is arguably broad enough to encompass any type of judicial
proceeding, including counterclaims" (Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal
Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, 81 (2nd Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted)), read in the context of Subsection (4), it is qualified by the
reference to "service of the complaint." Second, this reference to a
complaint is to a pleading that is filed at the commencement of a lawsuit
and that is commonly understood to be distinct from a counterclaim. See
e.g., Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d at
82; see also Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3 ("A civil action is commenced
(1) by filing of a complaint. .., or (2) by service of a summons together
with a copy of the complaint") & 7(a) (distinguishing a complaint from
other pleadings). Third., had the Legislature intended Sill's construction, it
could have easily provided for it {e.g., by substituting the words "initial
pleading" for "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a)). [R. 1464 (Decision, p. 3
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). A copy of the district court's
Decision is attached hereto as Addendum No. 1)].
Since Sill (rather than Hart) filed this action and served a "complaint," and since
what Hart served on Sill's attorneys was instead an answer that included the
Counterclaim, the district court held Subsection 4(a) did not apply to this case, that Hart
was not required to serve upon Sill any of the referenced LRFA materials, and that Hart
was therefore entitled to recover prejudgment interest, attorney fees and costs, and to
foreclose his mechanics' lien. (R. 1462-66 (Decision), Addendum No. 3 hereto).
Consistent with the Decision, a "Final Judgment, Order and Decree of
Foreclosure" (the "Order") was signed, approved as to form by legal counsel for Sill,
and entered by the district court. The Order, among other things, confirmed the validity
and enforceability of Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure Counterclaim and awarded all of
the prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs claimed by Hart, the amount of which

Sill did not dispute. (R. 1467-71). A copy of the district court's Order is attached hereto
as Addendum No. 4.
Sill appealed the district court's Decision. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed,
stating that Subsection 4(a) "does not require the service specifically of a complaint," that
"the statute here is triggered c[i]f a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien,'" and
that for that purpose "the term 'complaint,' as it is used in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), includes
counterclaims." Sill v. Hart, 128 P.3d 1215, 1218 & 1219, Iffl 9 & 13 (Utah Ct. App.
2005), rehearing denied (January 5, 2006). A copy of the Court of Appeals' opinion (the
"Opinion") is attached hereto as Addendum No. 1. The appellate court therefore
remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether attorney fees and
prejudgment interest were recoverable by Hart, applying Subsection 4(a) to Hart but also
in light of Sill's failure to raise Subsection 4(a) as an affirmative defense in his reply to
the Counterclaim. Id. at 1219,ffl[15-17 (Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1
hereto). Hart timely filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Rehearing, which was
denied without explanation. A copy of the Court of Appeals Order denying the Petition
for Rehearing is attached hereto as Addendum No. 2. Hart then petitioned this Court for
a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' Opinion, which was granted.

372617 1

II.

Statement of Facts
1.

Sill owned certain real property in Summit County, Utah. (See e.g., R. 1-33

(Sill's Complaint, fl 4 & 10)).
2.

Sill, as the owner, entered into an agreement directly with Hart, as the

original or general contractor, for Hart to construct improvements to Sill's property. (See
e.g., R. 1-33 (Sill's Complaint, % 11)).
3.

In January, 2002, Sill filed this action and a complaint against Hart

claiming, among other things, a breach of the parties' construction agreement. (See e.g.,
R. 1-33 (Sill's Complaint)).
4.

Sill then served his complaint on Hart. (See e.g., R. 34-36).

5.

In February, 2002, Hart filed an answer to Sill's complaint, and included a

counterclaim, and later an amended counterclaim (identified and referred to above, and
hereinafter, collectively, as the "Counterclaim"), in which Hart sought, among other
things, to foreclose a mechanics' lien securing payment from Sill for the improvements
Hart made to Sill's property. (See e.g., R. 37-58; R. 59-81).
6.

At all times throughout this case, Sill has always been represented by legal

counsel. (See e.g., R. 1-33; district court's docket generally).
7.

Hart served his Counterclaim by mail upon Sill's attorneys of record in this

case. (See e.g., R. 58; R. 81).
8.

After the jury awarded Hart the full $314,500.00 principal amount he

claimed was owed by Sill, and after hearing and rejecting Sill's arguments made after the
trial for application of Subsection 4(a) to this case, the district court awarded Hart, among

other things, an additional combined amount of $303,305.55 in reasonable attorney fees,
costs, and prejudgment interest. (R. 1467-71). Sill did not appeal any of the amounts
awarded to Hart. Sill appealed only the district court's Decision rejecting his claim that
Subsection 4(a) somehow barred recovery of attorney fees and prejudgment interest.
(R. 1244-48, 1369-79, 1383-94, 1411-20, 1448-53, 1493).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Based upon its conclusion that Subsection 4(a) of Utah's mechanics' lien statutes
applied to this case, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed portions of the district court's
Decision and Order awarding to Hart more than $300,000 in attorney fees, court costs,
and prejudgment interest upon Hart's successful prosecution of his Counterclaim to
foreclose his mechanics' lien. The question for review by this Court is whether the Utah
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court and in holding for the first time ever
that Subsection 4(a) requires counterclaiming general contractors to serve upon
homeowners who sue them instructions and forms relating to rights available to some
homeowners as against only subcontractors under the LRFA, or else lose all of their
rights and remedies under Utah's mechanics' lien statutes.
The Court of Appeals' Opinion is contrary to the plain language of
Subsection 4(a) specifically, to the long-recognized intent, purpose and policy of Utah's
mechanics' lien statutes generally, and to several cannons of statutory construction. The
Court of Appeals' Opinion also is contrary to the LRFA under which Sill admittedly had
no rights in this case and which Sill admits did not apply to and would not have made any

372617 1

difference to the outcome of this case. The Court of Appeals' Opinion essentially, as a
matter of first impression, punishes Hart for not providing Sill instructions and forms that
Hart, as a counterclaimant, was not required to provide on the face of Subsection 4(a),
and which Sill admits he could not have used in this case in any event.
Subsection 4(a) expressly applies only if the lien claimant files an action and
serves a "complaint" on the owner of residential property. In this case, it was the owner,
Sill, who served a complaint upon Hart. As the defendant in the case, Hart indisputably
never filed or served a complaint on Sill. Rather, Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure was
a part of Hart's Counterclaim that was served by mail upon Sill's attorneys.
Subsection 4(a)'s reference to service of LRFA instructions and forms with a
"complaint," therefore, does not apply to this case. The Court of Appeals' Opinion
applying Subsection 4(a) to Hart's Counterclaim changed the plain language of the
statute as chosen and drafted by the Legislature. Such alterations of legislative
enactments are in derogation of established rules of statutory construction, and if allowed
to stand would impermissibly create traps for parties and their legal counsel who could no
longer rely upon or follow the plain language of statutes. This Court should therefore
reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion, and confirm that by virtue of its express reference
to service of a "complaint" Subsection 4(a) does not apply to Hart's Counterclaim in this
case.
This Court should also reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion because service of
LRFA instructions and forms that are the subject of this case would have been a
completely useless act that would not have made any difference whatsoever to the

outcome of this case. The LRFA instructions and forms referenced in Subsection 4(a)
relate solely to rights available to certain homeowners as against only liens of
subcontractors, and only after the homeowner has paid in full the original general
contractor. Sill admits that Hart was his general contractor, not a subcontractor subject to
the LRFA. Sill also had not paid Hart in full, as the jury found and from which Sill does
not appeal. Sill therefore indisputably had no rights under the LRFA in this case. Since
Subsection 4(a) expressly requires service of LRFA instructions and forms only relating
to "available rights" of "the owner" under the LRFA, and sinceSill admittedly and
indisputably had no such rights of any kind in this case, Subsection 4(a) does not require
service of the referenced LRFA instructions and forms in this case which simply do not
apply and would have been of no use to Sill whatsoever.
This Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals' interpretation of
Subsection 4(a) which is contrary to the long-recognized legislative purpose of the
mechanics' lien statutes to protect those such as Hart who perform work upon and
provide improvements to real property. The Court of Appeals' interpretation of
Subsection 4(a) as an impediment to Hart's lien foreclosure Counterclaim in this case is
contrary to the language of Subsection 4(a), and to the mechanics' lien laws generally.
That interpretation grants to Sill a windfall in the form of a luxury home built by Hart
without Sill having to pay for it for more than two years and without paying at all the
accrued interest and the attorney fees that Hart had to expend forcing collection of the

amount due and owing to him by virtue of Sill's refusal to pay. This Court should not
reward Sill with such a windfall to Hart's substantial detriment, including as a matter of
law under the express language of Subsection 4(a) which the Court of Appeals
misinterpreted. This Court should instead reverse the Court of Appeals and uphold the
district court's Decision and Order declaring Subsection 4(a) inapplicable, and otherwise
not any bar, to Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure Counterclaim.

ARGUMENT
I.

SUBSECTION 4(a) EXPRESSLY APPLIES ONLY WHEN A LIEN
CLAIMANT FILES AND SERVES A "COMPLAINT," AND THEREFORE
DOES NOT APPLY TO COUNTERCLAIMS
The Court of Appeals' application of Subsection 4(a) to Hart's Counterclaim is

contrary to the plain language of that statute. On its face Subsection 4(a) expressly
applies only when a lien claimant files and serves on a defendant property owner a
"complaint." At the time Sill initiated this action by filing his complaint, Subsection 4(a)
read as follows:
3

While this case has been pending on appeal, Sill has paid Hart the principal amount
owed for Hart's work upon and improvements to the Property, which the jury awarded in
precisely the amount originally claimed by Hart, and the costs that were awarded to Hart.
Sill has not paid, however, the prejudgment interest and attorney fee amounts awarded by
the district court and not appealed by Sill. This Court has recognized that recovery of
attorney fees is vitally important to mechanics' liens. "The purpose of the mechanic's
lien is to protect those whose labor or materials have enhanced the value of property.
[The attorney fee provision of the mechanic's lien statutes] strengthens that protection by
ensuring someone who successfully uses a mechanic's lien to enforce a payment
obligation for such enhancement will not ultimately bear the legal costs of that
enforcement action. It also functions as a penalty for one who wrongly fails to pay for
enhancement to his property." A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT
47, If 24, 94 P.3d 270, 276.

(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of the
residence: .... [(Utah Code § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) (emphasis added)].
Subsection 4(a) expressly applies only if the lien claimant files an action and
serves a "complaint" on a homeowner to foreclose a mechanics' lien. Subsection 4(a)
therefore does not apply to this case in which it is Sill, the homeowner, who is the
plaintiff that filed the action and served a complaint, while Hart, the lien claimant, is the
defendant who instead filed an answer and Counterclaim.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Subsection 4(a) applied to Hart's answer and
Counterclaim purportedly because "the statute is triggered [merely] if a lien claimant files
an action to enforce a lien under the Mechanics' Liens Act involving a residence" and
"does not require the service specifically of a complaint." Sill v. Hart, 128 P.3d 1215,
1218, Tj 9 (emphasis added) (Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). That
ruling is contrary to and writes-out the plain, and express reference in Subsection 4(a)
specifically to a "complaint" as the only pleading with which the referenced LRFA
instructions and forms are to be served. The Court of Appeals itself later acknowledged
that "the statute specifically references 'the service of the complaint,'" but reasoned that
Subsection 4(a) nevertheless applied to Hart's Counterclaim, ostensibly because "the
term 'complaint' is frequently interpreted in Utah caselaw as including counterclaims."
Id. at 1219, ^ 13 (Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). The Court of
Appeals' Opinion is an incorrect and unsupportable deviation from the language of
Subsection 4(a), and well-settled rules of statutory construction and mechanics' lien law

and policy. This Court should therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion, and
adopt the Decision of the district court that Subsection 4(a) has no application to Hart's
Counterclaim in this case.

A.

The Court of Appeals' Application of Subsection 4(a) to Hart's
Counterclaim is Contrary to the Express Statutory Language and
Established Rules of Statutory Construction

It is well-settled that when interpreting a statute the courts must interpret the actual
words appearing on the face of the statute itself, reading them literally and according to
their plain and ordinary meaning. E.g., Gillman v. Sprint Comm. Co., 2004 UT App 143,
11 7, 91 P.3d 858, cert, denied, 98 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). Rules of statutory construction
further require courts to "assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly" and
therefore require that "'the statutory words are read literally....'" Id. (quotations and
citations omitted). This Court has also held that when interpreting a statute courts must
"not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there," Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112,1f 30, 38 P.3d 291 (quotations
and citations omitted).
The plain, ordinary, and literal meaning of the term "complaint" appearing in
Subsection 4(a) is the first pleading, filed by a plaintiff, to initiate a lawsuit:
The initial pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis for the
court's jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiffs claim, and the demand for
relief. [Black's Law Dictionary 303 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added)].
The original or initial pleading by which an action is commenced under
codes or Rules of Civil Procedure. [Black's Law Dictionary 258 (5th ed.
1979) (emphasis added)].

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are in accord, and provide that "fa] civil action
is commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons
together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with rule 4." Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a).
By contrast, the plain and ordinary meaning of a counterclaim, which Hart filed, is
in opposition to a "complaint." Specifically, a counterclaim is "[a] claim presented by a
defendant in opposition to or deduction from the claim of the plaintiff." Black's Law
Dictionary 349 (6th ed. 1990).
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognize "complaints" and counterclaims as
distinct and different, including defining them in completely different rules. See e.g.,
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) ("Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer....")
(emphasis added); id. 13(a) ("Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a
counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party...") (emphasis added).
The Utah Legislature also recognizes that distinction and specifically uses the term
"counterclaim" when it intends a statute to apply to counterclaims. See e.g., Utah Code
Ann. § 42-2-10 (2005) (stating parties may not maintain "any action, suit, counterclaim,
cross complaint, or proceeding" unless certain requirements are met) (emphasis added);
id., § 78-7-35 (separately delineating filing fees applicable to a "complaint," and to a
"counterclaim," and other pleadings) (emphasis added).
The Utah Legislature was precise when it designated only one pleading {i.e., a
"complaint") as being subject to the requirements of Subsection 4(a). The Legislature

could easily have required that the LRFA instructions and forms referred to in
Subsection 4(a) be served with "the complaint or the answer containing a counterclaim."
Simpler yet, the Legislature could have used the term "pleading," instead of "complaint."
It did not. Rather, the Legislature specifically and expressly referred exclusively to a
"complaint" as the only pleading with which LRFA instructions and forms must be
served.
As shown above, long-settled rules of statutory construction require that the
Legislature's exclusive reference to a "complaint" in Subsection 4(a) be treated as
purposefully and advisedly adopted. Additional rules of statutory construction require
that the exclusive reference in Subsection 4(a) to service of a "complaint" must be
deemed to exclude application of that statute to any other pleadings, and that such
exclusion must be respected and enforced by the courts. See e.g., State v. Hobbs, 2003
UT App 27, If 21, 64 P.3d 1218 (noting rules of statutory construction that expression of
one thing implies exclusion of another, and omissions in statutory language must be taken
note of and given effect); Sorenson's Ranch School v. Oram, 2001 UT App 354, % 11, 36
P.3d 528 (same).
The Court of Appeals' Opinion applying Subsection 4(a) to Hart's Counterclaim
violates all of the above rules of statutory construction, including the prohibition against
inferring substantive terms into a statute that are not already there. It also improperly
renders the word "complaint" as used in Subsection 4(a) meaningless, in violation of yet
another rule of statutory construction. See e.g., Lund v. Brown, 2001 UT 75, ^J 23, 11
P.3d 277 ("[A]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or

superfluous is to be avoided.") (quotations and citations omitted). The Court of Appeals
strayed from the clear language of the statute (i.e., "complaint"), and inferred substantive
terms (i.e., counterclaim) into the statutory text that are not there. It ignored the literal
words of the statute advisedly chosen by the Legislature referring exclusively to a
"complaint" to be served on the owner as the only pleading that is subject to any
requirements of Subsection 4(a). This Court therefore should reverse the Court of
Appeals' Opinion.

B.

The Court of Appeals' Inclusion of Counterclaims Within the
Definition of a "Complaint" in Subsection 4(a) is Without Merit

There is no authority to support the Court of Appeals' Opinion that the term
"complaint," as used in Subsection 4(a), includes counterclaims. The various cases cited
by the Court of Appeals in support of its proposition that "the term 'complaint' is
frequently interpreted in Utah case law as including counterclaims," (Sill v. Hart, 128
P.3d 1215, 1219, TJ13 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No.
1 hereto), are off-point and do not support that court's significant departure from the
governing statutory language.
The Court of Appeals' citations to State ex rel Road Comm 'n v. Parker, 13 Utah
2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962) and Barman v. Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d 695, 696
(1943), Id. (Addendum No. 1), are unavailing. Neither of those cases have any
application to this case. They spoke merely to the pleading standards required for
counterclaims generally (i.e., that they must state facts sufficient to support a claim for
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relief, as distinguished from merely stating a defense to a plaintiffs complaint). Neither
of those cases dealt with Subsection 4(a), nor involved construction of the word
"complaint" or "counterclaim" as a statutory term, and particularly not under the rubric of
Utah's mechanics' lien statutes.
Nor do the mechanics' lien cases cited by the Court of Appeals support its
application of Subsection 4(a) to Hart's Counterclaim. The For-Shor Co. v. Early, 828
P.2d 1080 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and First Gen. Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) cases, for example, both involved lien claimants who were plaintiffs, not
counterclaimants. Moreover, Subsection 4(a) was not even enacted until 2001, long after
the opinions were issued in those cases.
The only other mechanics' lien case cited by the Court of Appeals is American
Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah Ct. App.
1997). That case dealt with the attorney fee provision of Utah's mechanics' lien statute,
Utah Code Section 38-1-18. Since the court in that case held that attorney fees are
recoverable for successfully prosecuting a counterclaim to enforce a mechanics' lien, the
Court of Appeals cited to American Rural in this case as support for the proposition that
"Utah courts have interpreted similar language [to Subsection 4(a)'s reference to "an
action"] to include counterclaims." Sill, 128 P.3d at 1218, % 12 (Utah Ct. App. 2005)
(Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). There is a striking difference,
however, between the statutory language of the attorney fee provision at issue in
American Rural, and that of Subsection 4(a) at issue in this case. The American Rural

case therefore actually is contrary to, and highlights the impropriety of, the Court of
Appeals' Opinion applying Subsection 4(a) to Hart's Counterclaim.
The attorney fee provision that was at issue in American Rural stated, in its
entirety:
In any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee,
to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as a cost in the action.
[Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (emphasis added)].
The expansive and unqualified language of section 38-1-18 allowing recovery of
fees by the successful party "in any action" brought to enforce a mechanics' lien is
markedly different than the limited and qualified language of Subsection 4(a), which
states that certain forms and instructions are to be served only if the lien claimant "files
an action" and serves a "complaint" on the homeowner. The American Rural case
properly concluded that a mechanics' lien foreclosure counterclaim is within the attorney
fee provision that broadly applies to "any action." That, however, simply confirms and
highlights that Subsection 4(a) does not apply to counterclaims, since the word "action"
is used in the attorney fee provision at issue in American Rural without limitation or
qualification of any kind (and indeed with the expansive "any"), whereas the word
"action" as it is used in Subsection 4(a) that is at issue in this case is specifically and
expressly limited and qualified in that section by the term "complaint." The addition of
the qualifying term "complaint" in Subsection 4(a), which was enacted long after the
attorney fee provision, shows the Legislature's intent to distinguish and limit the term
"action," as used in Subsection 4(a), from the expansive and unqualified "any action"

language of the fee provision. Had the Legislature intended that same expansive
application for Subsection 4(a), it would have left the term "action" unqualified as it did
in the attorney fee provision. Instead, however, it distinguished Subsection 4(a) by
adding the limiting and qualifying reference to a "complaint" as the only pleading with
which LRFA instructions and forms would be served. Since the "action" to which
Subsection 4(a) applies expressly is limited to where the lien claimant files and serves a
"complaint," it does not apply to Hart's Counterclaim.
The most closely analogous case to the case at bar of which Hart is aware is the
case relied upon by the district court in its Decision: Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal
Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73 (2nd Cir. 2003). There, the court was faced with the
question of whether a counterclaim that was financed by an employer was barred by a
statute stating that "[n]o labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court... provided further, That [sic] no interested employer or
employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in,
except as a party, any such action ...." Pelella, 350 F.3d at 80 (emphasis added). The
Pelella court correctly held that it was not, explaining:
The word "action," without more, is arguably broad enough to
encompass any type of judicial proceeding, including counterclaims
We need not decide, however, whether the word "action," standing
alone, embraces Pelella's counterclaim for the purposes of section
101 (a)(4)'s second proviso. "[T|he meaning of statutory language, plain or
not depends on context." In the statutory context of section 101 (a)(4), the
word "action is qualified by the phrase "to institute."
A party institutes an action when he commences a judicial
proceeding. A party commences a judicial proceeding when he takes the
first step that invokes the judicial process.

An action is therefore instituted when a plaintiff files a complaint as
that constitutes the first step invoking the judicial process. In sharp
contrast, a defendant asserts a counterclaim in response to a plaintiffs
institution of an action. A counterclaim, by definition, is a "claim for relief
asserted against an opposing party after an original claim has been made."
Counterclaims are therefore "generally asserted in the answer" to a
previously filed complaint.
In other words, a defendant does not "institute" an action when he
asserts a counterclaim. Rather, a plaintiff must commence the action by
filing a complaint that names a defendant. This affords the defendant the
ability to file a responsive pleading, namely the answer, in which he can
include a claim for relief against the opposing party. [Pelella, 350 F.3d at
81-82 (citations deleted) (emphasis added)].
Similarly, the word "action" in Subsection (4)(a), that is at issue in this case, must
be read in context, and it is qualified by that section's reference to service of a
"complaint." See also e.g., Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, % 17, 66 P.3d 592 (noting rule
of statutory construction requiring court to look to "the plain language of the statute as a
whole") (emphasis added); Sorenson 's Ranch School v. Oram, 2001 UT App 354, ^J 11,
36 P.3d 528 (noting if the Legislature had intended a broader application of statute, it
would not have added language that qualified and limited statute's reach). Pelella
upholds the proposition, which governs in this case, that the express statutory language
must be followed. It also confirms that a counterclaim is properly considered as
something "in sharp contrast" from a "complaint." Subsection 4(a) does not apply to this
case in which Hart did not file this "action" nor serve a "complaint," and this Court
should reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion which misinterpreted Subsection 4(a).

C.

Stretching the Statutory Term "Complaint" to Include Hart's
Counterclaim Creates Confusion and a Trap

The Court of Appeals in this case ultimately concluded that "the term 'complaint,'
as it is used in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), includes counterclaims" because "a literal reading
of the term 'complaint' would be 'unreasonably confusing]' and render the statute
'inoperable.'" Sill v. Hart, 128 P.3d 1215, 1219, \ 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (Court of
Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). The Court of Appeals failed, however, to
provide any explanation as to how a literal reading of the statutory term "complaint"
(which is the required reading of statutory terms according to established rules of
statutory construction discussed in Part LA. above) would be in any way confusing or
render Subsection 4(a) inoperable. To the contrary, Subsection 4(a) is clear and entirely
operable with a plain language interpretation of its exclusive application to a "complaint"
served on the owner. It is instead the Court of Appeals' Opinion which creates confusion
by, for the first time, straying from the express language of Subsection 4(a) and applying
it to pleadings other than a "complaint." That ruling and departure from the statutory
language and rules of judicial construction leaves parties not knowing in advance of the
ruling what a statute means and requires, based upon its plain facial language. It leaves
parties having to guess at their peril whether the statute will be applied to other situations
beyond what is described by the clear statutory language itself, and therefore unable to
govern their conduct with any assurity as to whether something more will later be
deemed to be required of them beyond what appears on the face of the statute. Hart in
particular had no way to know, including having no prior judicial guidance, that the term

"complaint" in Subsection 4(a) would be deemed to apply to his Counterclaim in this
case. See e.g., Gillman v. Sprint Comrn. Co., L.P., 2004 UT App 143,1j 7, 91 P.3d 858
("It is the plain meaning of a statute that provides notice of its applications, and thus,
unless the plain meaning is ambiguous or fails to make sense of the statute as a whole, we
do not look beyond the text.")
Any interpretation of Subsection 4(a) that would broaden its application beyond
cases in which the lienholder itself first files the action and serves a "complaint" on the
homeowner renders the Legislature's careful wording inoperative and meaningless.
Since Subsection 4(a) on its face applies only when a lienholder first files an action and
serves the homeowner with a "complaint," and since neither of those occurred in this
case, Subsection 4(a) does not apply to Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure Counterclaim.
The Court of Appeals erred in stretching the term "complaint" to include a Counterclaim
like Hart's.4 This Court should therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion.

4

The Court of Appeals also based its Opinion that Subsection 4(a) applies to
counterclaims in part on its determination that "the term 'if,' which triggers the statute,
modifies only the language in the first clause of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) and not the word
'complaint,' which appears in the second clause." Sill v. Hart. 128 P.3d 1215, 1218, ^J 9
(Utah Ct. App. 2005) (Court of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). As shown
in the main text above, however, on its face Subsection 4(a) expressly applies only where
a "complaint" is served, regardless of whether, grammatically, the " i f in Subsection 4(a)
modifies "complaint." Additionally, the Court of Appeals' analysis on the scope of the
effect of the word " i f in Subsection 4(a) misconstrues the language of the statute
because there simply are no separate clauses within Subsection 4(a). Rather, it contains
one single-clause sentence with a set of commas that merely set off the definition of a
"residence" as that term is used in Subsection 4(a). There is no shift in subject, topic, or
thought after the commas that set off the citation to the other statutory definition section.
The material before those commas and after them therefore are not separate clauses.
Accordingly, the entire introductory sentence of Subsection 4(a), including the word
"complaint," all is modified, qualified, and limited by the " i f that begins

II.

SUBSECTION 4(a) DOES NOT REQUIRE SERVICE OF THE
REFERENCED INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMS WHERE THEY
ADMITTEDLY PROVIDED SILL NO RIGHT OR REMEDY AGAINST
HART
A.

There Was Nothing to Serve Upon Sill on the Face of Subsection 4(a)

Sill was not entitled to receive from Hart the instructions and forms referenced in
Subsection 4(a) even apart from Hart never having filed or served the statutorily-required
"complaint." It is well-established that when interpreting a statute the Court should look
to "the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT
12 f 17, 66 P.3d 592 (emphasis added). It is highly significant to this case that
Subsection 4(a) expressly states that what is to be included "with the service of the
complaint on the owner of the residence" is:
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the ownerfs rights
under Title 38, Chapter 11„ Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery
Fund Act [identified and referred to above, and hereinafter, as the
"LRFA"]; and
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner
of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner may exercise
available rights under Tthe LRFA1. [(Utah Code § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001)
(emphasis added)].
Sill indisputably and admittedly did not have any rights under the LRFA as against
Hart. There was therefore nothing required to be served upon Sill on the face of
Subsection 4(a).
Subsection 4(a). Subsection 4(a) therefore applies only "if' the lien claimant "files an
action" and specifically serves a "complaint on the owner" (emphasis added).

The LRFA is a statute which protects homeowners from having to pay twice for
the same improvements made to their home. It does so by providing that once a
homeowner has paid its general contractor in full the homeowner and the home are then
free from claims and liens of subcontractors who worked on the home. See e.g., Utah
Code Ann. § 38-11-102(14) (2001) (defining "original contractor" as "a person who
contracts with the owner of real property"); id., § 38-11-107(1) (providing homeowners
relief only against parties with contracts "other than directly with the owner"); id. § 381 l-204(3)(b) (providing homeowners relief oniy after the homeowner "has paid in full
the original contractor"). In such cases, the LRFA instructions and forms referenced in
Subsection 4(a) provide a mechanism for the homeowner to quickly and easily, without
having to incur the expense of retaining counsel,5 complete the forms to swear and certify
to the court that he has already paid in full the original or general contractor for the
improvements and therefore obtain summary judgment requiring removal of the lien of a
subcontractor.
The LRFA does not apply to and has no bearing or effect whatsoever on the liens
and claims of original or general contractors, and certainly not general contractors whom
the homeowner has not paid in full. Sill himself correctly admits, and the Court of
Appeals acknowledged, that Hart was an original, general contractor, with whom Sill
contracted directly. Sill indisputably did not pay Hart in full (as evidenced most
poignantly by the jury awarding Hart judgment against Sill in the full principal amount of

5

There is simply no need for such instructions or forms where the homeowner himself,
Sill in this case, is the one who initiated the lawsuit and had already retained an attorney.

the $314,500 claimed by Hart for the improvements made to Sill's property). Since
Subsection 4(a) calls for service only of forms relating to "the owner's rights" and
"available rights" under the LRFA, and since Sill indisputably and admittedly did not
have any such rights as against Hart, there simply were no instructions or forms to be
served upon Sill under the plain language of Subsection 4(a).

B.

The Law Does Not Require Performance of a Useless Act

The Court of Appeals' Opinion improperly imposed a requirement to serve
admittedly inapplicable LRFA instructions and forms that would have been of no use to
Sill, and which could not have made any difference whatsoever to the outcome of this
case. Even if he had received LRFA instructions and forms, Sill had no rights under the
LRFA and would not have been able to make any use of them. Service of those
instructions and forms would not and could not have changed one bit what Sill did in this
case or what the outcome was. Service of such forms therefore would have been a
completely vain and useless act, which the law does not require. See e.g., Carr v. Enoch
Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating the law does not require
one to do a vain or useless thing); Leger Const., Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212, 214
(Utah 1976) (same); accord e.g., Defee v. Kaley, 167 S.E.2d 758, 759 (Ga. Ct. App.
1969) (sustaining oral motion to dismiss even though statute required motion to be in
writing and served on adverse party, since the case still would properly have been
dismissed if written motion had been made, noting the law does not require one "to do
that which would be fruitless"); Cichecki v. City of Hamtramack Police Dep't, 170

N.W.2d 58, 61 (Mich. 1969) (holding parties did not have to make a demand required
under statute, because making such demand would have been "futile," and the "law does
not require a party to perform a useless act").
In footnote 3 of its Opinion the Court of Appeals stated that "the responsibility of
determining whether the owner being sued has rights under the [LRFA] does not belong
to the lien claimant." Sill v. Hart, 128 P.3d 1215, 1218, f 9 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (Court
of Appeals' Opinion, Addendum No. 1 hereto). That claim, however, ignores the plain
language of Subsection 4(a) and the admitted facts of this case. Subsection 4(a)
expressly requires service (only with a "complaint" to foreclose a mechanics' lien upon a
residence) only of instructions and forms "relating to the owner's rights" and "upon
which the owner may exercise available rights" under the LRFA. Utah Code Ann. §§381-1 l(4)(a)(i) & (ii). Just like it is the responsibility of the lien claimant to determine
whether the property at issue is a residence as defined in and subject to the LRFA, so too
is it the responsibility of the lien claimant to determine whether the owner of a residence
has rights under the LRFA on the facts of the situation at issue -just the same as it is the
lien claimant's responsibility to determine whether it may properly take any steps under
the mechanics' lien act.
In an appropriate case a court may later find that a subcontractor made an incorrect
determination and is barred by Subsection 4(a) for failing to serve an owner with LRFA
instructions and forms to which they are entitled. This case, however, is not such a case.
Here, it is admitted by Sill, and otherwise indisputable, that Sill had no rights under the
LRFA as against his unpaid general contractor, Hart. In light of such admitted and

indisputable facts, and further in light of the plain language appearing in Subsection 4(a)
requiring service of LRFA instructions and forms only where the owner has rights under
the LRFA, this Court should uphold that Subsection 4(a) does not apply to this case and
does not require the meaningless act of service of LRFA instructions and forms that are
inapplicable and useless to Sill as against Hart. The Court should not punish Hart, as the
Court of Appeals did, for not providing something that he had no duty to provide on the
face of Subsection 4(a).

C.

The Court of Appeals' Opinion is At Odds with Legislative History and
Intent

The legislative history of Subsection 4(a) confirms that it does not apply to this
case because of Sill's acknowledged lack of rights under the LRFA. The legislative
history of Subsection 4(a), both at the time it was originally adopted in 2001, and when it
was later amended in 2004, confirms it is only subcontractors whose liens and other
collection rights are affected by the LRFA that is referenced in Subsection 4(a).
Accordingly, it is only subcontractors who the Legislature intended be required by
Subsection 4(a) to provide the LRFA instructions and forms.
The Senate committee hearings and the Senate floor debates on the proposed
addition of the requirement to serve LRFA instructions and forms when Subsection (4)(a)
was first adopted in 2001 both confirm that the requirement does not apply to cases like
this one in which a general contractor is seeking payment in the first instance from the
homeowner for services provided by the general contractor. See e.g., S.B. 254, 1st

Substitution, 2001 Gen. Leg. Sess., Senate Business, Labor and Economic Development
Standing Committee Meeting held 02/16/01 (discussing the proposed Subsection 4(a),
explaining the LRFA referenced therein is designed to provide protection against
subcontractors when a homeowner has already paid in full the general contractor for the
project who then fails to pay subcontractors); S.B. 254, 1st Substitution, 2001 Gen. Leg.
Sess., Senate Floor Debate held 02/20/01 (stating the LRFA is aimed at "the situation of
the innocent homeowner who pays [his general contractor] for the house, and then ... has
to pay for his house a second time" to remove a lien of a subcontractor whom the general
contractor failed to pay).
Likewise, when Subsection (4)(a) was amended in 2004 (to require service of
only the instructions and form affidavit, deleting the requirement to serve a form
summary judgment motion - see Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4) (2004)), the Senate
committee hearings and floor debates both again reiterated that the requirement to serve
any of those forms under Subsection 4(a) only applies to subcontractors and suppliers
who are not in direct privity of contract with the homeowner, and not to general
contractors. See e.g., H.B. 32, H.B. 62, H.B. 182, 2004 Gen. Leg. Sess., Senate Business
and Labor Standing Committee Meeting held 01/30/04 (discussing the proposed
amendment to Subsection 4(a) and noting "the primary focus [of the LRFA that is
referenced in Subsection (4)(a)] was designed to protect homeowners who deal with the
general contractor, and pay the general contractor in full, from having liens filed against
their property [by subcontractors] so that they would have to pay twice."); H.B. 32, H.B.
62, H.B. 182, 2004 Gen. Leg. Sess., Senate Floor Debate held 02/04/04 (noting the LRFA

was designed "to take care of the suppliers that couldn't get the money from the [general]
contractor" whom the homeowner had paid in full).
When interpreting a statute, the "primary goal is to give effect to the Legislature's
intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Perez, 2000 UT
App 65, H 6, 999 P.2d 579 (quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 117, 194 (Utah 1998)
(internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted)). In order to give effect to the
Legislature's intent with respect to Subsection 4(a), a general contractor must not be held
to a requirement, as the Court of Appeals imposed in this case, to serve with a
counterclaim inapplicable and useless instructions and forms upon a homeowner who has
sued him. This Court therefore should reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion which is
contrary to the Legislature's intent as shown in both the language of Subsection 4(a) and
its legislative history.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS5 OPINION DEPARTS FROM AND
UNDERMINES THE LONG-RECOGNIZED PURPOSES AND
CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTES
It has been long and repeatedly recognized that the intent and purpose of Utah's

mechanics' lien statutes, of which Subsection 4(a) is a part, "manifestly has been to
protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and furnish the materials which enter
into the construction of a building or other improvement." John Wagner Assoc, v.
Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Utah courts further have held
that to effect that purpose, the mechanics' lien statutes are to be construed liberally in
favor of parties who, like Hart in this case, improve real property. Butter field Lumbery

Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage. Corp., 815 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This Court
also has noted and followed the "modern trend" in mechanics' lien cases "to dispense
with arbitrary rules which have no demonstrable value in a particular fact situation."
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah
1990) (upholding lien against attack where claimed deficiencies did not prejudice other
party) (emphasis added).
The district court's Decision that Subsection 4(a) is inapplicable to this case is
firmly rooted in the express language of Subsection 4(a) specifically. It also is in
harmony with and serves the intended purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes generally
of protecting Hart who substantially improved Sill's property.
The Court of Appeals' Opinion, by contrast, contorts the plain language of
Subsection 4(a) and extends it to facts and circumstances to which on its face it clearly
does not apply {i.e., the Counterclaim of an unpaid general contractor), including despite
the indisputable and admitted fact that the LRFA instructions and forms had no value
whatsoever to Sill as against Hart and could not have changed the outcome of this case.
All of this is, contrary to the purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes, to the detriment of,
and indeed as an impediment to recovery by, Hart whom the jury found substantially
improved Sill's Property. The result is an enormous windfall to Sill, allowing him to
delay for several years payment for his luxury home built by Hart without having to pay
interest in the meantime on the money owed by Sill, nor the attorney fees and costs that
Hart was required to expend in order to obtain and collect a judgment against Sill for the

amount he justly owed. This Court has recognized that recovery of those amounts in
addition to the principal amount owed is vitally important to the mechanics' lien system:
The purpose of the mechanic's lien is to protect those whose labor or
materials have enhanced the value of property. [The attorney fee provision
of the mechanic's lien statutes] strengthens that protection by ensuring that
someone who successfully uses a mechanic's lien to enforce a payment
obligation for such enhancement will not ultimately bear the legal costs of
that enforcement action. It also functions as a penalty for one who wrongly
fails to pay for enhancement to his property. [A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing
and Heating v. Guy, supra, 2004 UT 47, f 24, 94 P.3d 270, 276; see also
e.g., Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1998)
(stating general rule that unpaid mechanic is entitled to interest from when
the last materials furnished)].
The courts should not award such windfalls to delinquent property owners like Sill
at the expense of contractors like Hart by novel interpretations of mechanics' lien
statutory provisions that apply them beyond their plain and ordinary meaning, and by
requiring actions from unpaid contractors that admittedly are of no use or benefit at all to
homeowners.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals' extension of Subsection 4(a) to the facts of this case is
contrary to the plain language of the statute and established rules of statutory
construction. It also punishes Hart for not providing to Sill instructions and forms that
admittedly did not apply to this case and could not have changed its outcome. The Court
of Appeals' Opinion improperly barred Hart from recovery of substantial attorney fees
incurred to force payment of, and prejudgment interest accruing for years on, the amount
justly owed by Sill. This Court should reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion, and

uphold the Decision of the district court in this case, that Subsection 4(a) is inapplicable
to this case and that Hart is entitled to the attorney fees and prejudgment interest awarded
to him for his successful prosecution of his mechanics' lien.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ T o T j u n e , 2006.
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1112 In holding that the defendant in Von
Murdoch was not an Indian, the 10th Circuit
court asserted jurisdiction and affirmed the
conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1165,
which prohibits hunting on land belonging to
an Indian tribe without permission. See Von
Murdoch, 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir.1997).
Likewise, in Felter, the court found that because the defendant no longer maintained
Indian status, the federal court could assert
jurisdiction rather than the tribal court. See
Felter, 752 F.2d 1505. The Felter court noted "that 18 U.S.C. § 1165 is not applicable to
tribal members who hunted in violation of
tribal regulation. Tribal jurisdiction over
such minor offenses remains exclusive." Id.
at 1512 n. 11 (quoting Felter, 546 F.Supp. at
1026). It remains clear, however, that "Indian tribes lack jurisdiction to try and punish
non-Indians for criminal offenses, and [thus,]
18 U.S.C. § 1165 was designed to fill the gap
in enforcement powers as to non-Indians
hunting or fishing on tribal or other Indians
lands without tribal permission." Id. The
Felter court thus reasoned that an Indian
hunting on Indian lands is under tribal jurisdiction, but a non-Indian hunting on Indian
lands is under federal jurisdiction. Nothing
in Von Murdoch or Felter suggests that state
courts can ever assert jurisdiction over hunting violations committed on Indian lands.
CONCLUSION
1113 We conclude that the crimes occurred
in Indian Country governed by the Ute
Tribe. Because the Ute Tribe is the victim,
the State does not have jurisdiction. We
therefore vacate the convictions.
1114 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS
and GREGORY K. ORME, Judges.
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the tribe." Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-211 (2003).
Similarly, pursuant to its jurisdiction over the
land, the Ute Tribe claims a property interest in
the wildlife. Section 8-1-3(1) of the Ute Law
and Order Code states:
All wildlife now or hereafter within the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation, not held by private
ownership legally acquired, and which for pur-

2005 UT App 537

Joel SILL, Plaintiff and Appellant,

Bill HART dba Hart Construction,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20050245-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 15, 2005.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 5, 2005.
Background: Property owner brought action against contractor alleging breach of
contract and other claims, and contractor
filed counterclaims seeking to foreclose a
mechanics' lien and for unjust enrichment.
The Third District Court, Silver Summit
Department, Deno Himonas, J., entered
judgment on a jury verdict in favor of
contractor, and awarded prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and court costs on
the mechanics' lien claim. Owner appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Davis,
J., held that:
(1) contractor was required to serve owner
with certain documents in connection
with the lien foreclosure counterclaim,
but
(2) contractor's failure to serve such documents did not deprive trial court of
jurisdiction over counterclaim.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Appeal and Error @=>842(8)
Questions of statutory interpretation are
questions of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the district
court's interpretation.
poses of this Code shall include all big game
animals . . . are hereby declared to be the
property of the Ute Indian Tribe.
Ute Law and Order Code § 8-1-3(1); cf. Utah
Code Ann. § 23-13-3 (2003) ("All wildlife existing within this state, not held by ownership and
legally acquired, is the property of the state.")-
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2. Appeal and Error <®=>842(1)
The determination of whether a trial
court has subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law, which Court of Appeals reviews for correctness, according no deference
to the trial court's determination.

Robert J. Dale, P. Bruce Badger, and
Bradley L. Tilt, Fabian & Clendenin, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges DAVIS, GREENWOOD,
and THORNE.
OPINION

3. Mechanics' Liens <s=*265
Contractor who was sued by owner for
breach of contract and on other claims, and
who filed counterclaim seeking to enforce a
mechanics' lien against owner's residence,
was required to serve owner with a form
affidavit and motion for summary judgment
and instructions relating to the owner's statutory rights, pursuant to statute requiring a
mechanics' lien claimant to include such documents "with the service of the complaint" if
the claimant "files an action to enforce" the
lien; filing of counterclaim was the filing of
an action to enforce the lien, and counterclaim constituted a "complaint" within the
meaning of the statute. West's U.C.A. § 38l-ll(4)(a).

DAVIS, Judge:
111 Plaintiff-counterclaim defendant Joel
Sill appeals from a final judgment and award
of prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and
court costs in favor of Defendant-counterclaimant Bill Hart. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND

Contractor's failure to serve property
owner with a form affidavit and motion for
summary judgment and instructions relating
to the owner's statutory rights, as required
by statute governing actions to enforce mechanics' liens against residences, did not deprive trial court of jurisdiction over contractor's counterclaim seeking to foreclose a
mechanics' lien against owner's residence,
which was filed in owner's action alleging
breach of contract and other claims; rather,
contractor's failure to comply with statute
was an avoidance or affirmative defense
raising matters outside the pleadings.
West's U.C.A. § 38-l-ll(4)(a); Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 8(c).

112 Sill is the owner of real property located in Summit County, Utah (the Property).
Hart, a general contractor, began construction on the Property in the summer of 1999
and continued until approximately December
2001, at which time Hart left the job over a
dispute with Sill regarding the completion of
the project. In January 2002, Sill brought
an action against Hart, alleging (1) breach of
contract, (2) breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, (3) breach of fiduciary
duty, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) intentional misrepresentation, (6) unjust enrichment, and (7) defamation. Hart counterclaimed in February 2002, alleging breach of
contract and unjust enrichment, and seeking
to foreclose a mechanics' lien on the Property.
113 More than two and a half years later,
in October 2004, Sill for the first time raised
the issue of Hart's compliance with Utah
Code section 38-l-Ll(4)(a). See Utah Code
Ann. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) (2001). The parties reserved the issue for post verdict determination, and the case went to trial one week
later. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Hart in the amount of $314,500 on Hart's
unjust enrichment and mechanics' lien
claims. In addition, Hart was awarded prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and court
costs on his mechanics' lien claim.

David B. Thompson, Miller, Vance &
Thompson, PC, Park City, for Appellant.

114 Hart thereafter sought to reduce the
verdict to judgment. Sill opposed the effort
insofar as it related to Hart's mechanics' lien
claim. Sill argued that the trial court lacked

4. Pleading ®=>34(1)
The character of a pleading will be determined by the court by the facts set out in
the pleading.
5. Mechanics' Liens <s>265
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jurisdiction to hear Hart's mechanics' lien
[1,2] 117 Questions of statutory interpreclaim because Hart, when he served his coun- tation are questions of law that are reviewed
terclaim on Sill, did not include the instruc- "for correctness, giving no deference to the
tions nor the form affidavit and motion for district court's interpretation." Board of
summary judgment required by section 38- Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37,118,
l-ll(4)(a).1 Hart disagreed, arguing that 94 P.3d 234. "The determination of whether
only plaintiffs filing a "complaint"—as op- a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a
posed to those filing a counterclaim—are re- question of law, which we review for correctquired to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). ness, according no deference to the [trial]
The trial court agreed with Hart and entered court's determination." Beaver County v.
judgment in his favor on both the unjust Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,18, 31 P.3d 1147.
enrichment and the mechanics' lien claims.
The court also awarded Hart prejudgment
ANALYSIS
interest, attorney fees, and court costs on his
[3] H 8 Prior to addressing Sill's jurisdicmechanics' lien claim. Sill timely appealed. tional claim, we first determine whether section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) is even applicable in this
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW case. The language at issue here states:
If a lien claimant files an action to enforce
H5 Under section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), a lien
a
lien filed under [the Mechanics' Liens
claimant filing an action to enforce a mechanAct]
involving a residence, as defined in
ics' lien on a residence must include certain
[s]ection
38-ll-102,[2] the lien claimant
documents relating to the Residence Lien
shall include with the service of the comRestriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act
plaint on the owner of the residence:
when he serves his complaint upon the owner
of the residence. See id. Pursuant to sec(i) instructions to the owner of the resition 38-1-1 l(4)(e), the lien claimant is
dence relating to the owner's rights under
"barred from maintaining or enforcing the
Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Relien" if he fails to provide such documents.
striction and Lien Recovery Fund Act;
Id. § 38-l-ll(4)(e).
and
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for sum1} 6 Hart concedes that he did not serve Sill
mary judgment to enable the owner of the
with the documents referenced in section 38residence to specify the grounds upon
l-ll(4)(a), but argues that section 38-1which the owner may exercise available
ll(4)(a) does not apply to his claim because
rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Resihe filed a counterclaim as opposed to a "comdence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery
plaint" and because Sill has no rights under
Fund Act.
the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. Sill, on the other hand, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a)(i)-(ii). Hart
argues not only that section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) is argues the statute applies only if the lien
applicable, but also that the language of sec- claimant "files an action" and serves a "comtion 38-1-1 l(4)(e) makes subsection 4(a) a plaint" to foreclose a mechanics' lien, and
jurisdictional provision. Sill therefore con- only if the owner being sued has rights under
tends that Hart's failure to comply with sec- the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Retion 38-1-1 l(4)(a) deprived the trial court of covery Fund Act. Hart therefore contends
jurisdiction to hear Hart's lien foreclosure that he was not required to serve the docuaction.
ments referenced in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) be1. In 2004, the legislature amended the statute to
require service of only the instructions and form
affidavit. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a)
(Supp.2004). However, the statute relevant to
these proceedings required service of instructions and a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment. See id. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001).

2. Under Utah Code section 38-11-102, a "residence" is defined as "an improvement to real
property used or occupied, to be used or occupied as, or in conjunction with, a primary or
secondary detached single-family dwelling or
multifamily dwelling up to two units, including
factory built housing." Utah Code Ann. § 3811-102(20) (2001).
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cause he filed a counterclaim, as opposed to more, Hart filed an action to enforce the lien
an initial complaint, to foreclose a mechanics' when he filed his counterclaim in February
lien and because Sill has no rights under the 2002. The fact that Sill had already filed a
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recov- complaint against Hart—alleging seven
ery Fund Act.
causes of action, all of which sounded in
U9 We disagree with Hart's contention common law and none of which were related
that section 38-l-ll(4)(a) requires the ser- to the Mechanics' Liens Act—does not affect
vice of a "complaint" and applies only if the Hart's role as "a lien claimant filfing] an
owner being sued has rights under the Resi- action to enforce a lien filed under [the Medence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery chanics' Liens Act] involving a residence, as
Fund Act. "When faced with a question of defined in [s]ection 38-11-102." Id. § 38-1statutory construction, we look first to the ll(4)(a). Hart therefore was required to
plain language of the statute," Gillman v. serve upon Sill the instructions and form
Sprint Communications Co., 2004 UT App affidavit and motion for summary judgment
143,11 7, 91 P.3d 858 (quotations and citation referenced in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a).
omitted), cert, denied, 98 P.3d 1177 (Utah
1111 Our interpretation of section 38-12004), and we "will not infer substantive ll(4)(a) is supported by Utah caselaw.
terms into the text that are not already When interpreting the plain language of a
there," Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board statute, we "assume that each term in the
of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112,1130, 38 statute was used advisedly; thus the statutoP.3d 291 (quotations and citation omitted). ry words are read literally, unless such a
The statute here is triggered "[i]f a lien reading is unreasonably confused or inoperaclaimant files an action to enforce a lien filed ble." Gillman, 2004 UT App 143 at U 7, 91
under [the Mechanics' Liens Act] involving a P.3d 858 (quotations and citation omitted).
residence, as defined in [s]ection 38-11-102." "It is axiomatic that a statute should be given
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a). By the a reasonable and sensible construction, and
plain language of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), the that the legislature did not intend an absurd
term "if," which triggers the statute, modifies or unreasonable result." State ex rel. Div. of
only the language in the first clause of sec- Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310,
tion 38-1-1 l(4)(a) and not the word "com- 313 (Utah 1988) (internal citation omitted).
plaint," which appears in the second clause.
1112 Here, the statute at issue applies to a
See id. The application of section 38-1lien claimant filing "an action to enforce a
ll(4)(a), therefore, does not require the serlien filed under [the Mechanics' Liens Act]."
vice specifically of a complaint, nor is the
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a). Utah
statute applicable only if the owner being
courts have interpreted similar language to
sued has rights under the Residence Lien
include counterclaims. See, e.g., American
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.3
Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems CommunicaInstead, the statute is triggered if a lien
tion Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 193 (Utah Ct.App.
claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed
1997) ("[Defendant] brought a counterclaim
under the Mechanics' Liens Act involving a
to foreclose its mechanics' liens. This clearly
residence as defined by section 38-11-102.
qualifies as *an[y] action brought to enforce
See id.
any lien' under the mechanics' lien statute."
U 10 Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) was clearly trig- (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (Supp.
gered here. Pursuant to the Mechanics' 1996))); First Gen. Servs. v. Perkins, 918
Liens Act, Hart recorded a notice of lien with P.2d 480, 486 (Utah Ct.App.1996) ("[T]he sucSummit County in January 2002, and neither cessful defense of counterclaims which would
party argues that such lien does not involve a otherwise defeat the principal lien claim . . .
residence as defined by section 38-11-102. must necessarily be considered for the purSee id. § 38-11-102(20) (2001). Further- pose of awarding attorney fees under [section
3. Furthermore, the responsibility of determining
whether the owner being sued has rights under
the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recov-

ery Fund Act does not belong to the lien claimant.
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38-1-18 of] the mechanics' lien statute. Logically, a lien holder must defend against such
claims in order to 'enforce' the lien." (quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1994))).
[4] 1113 Furthermore, although the statute specifically references "the service of the
complaint," Utah Code. Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a),
the term "complaint" is frequently interpreted in Utah caselaw as including counterclaims, see, e.g., State ex rel. Road Comm'n
v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585, 587
(1962) ("[N]either under our rules or elsewhere, can a counterclaimant cast himself in
any other role than that of a plaintiff."),
overruled in part on other grounds, Colman
v. State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990);
Harman v. Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d
695, 696 (1943) ("A counterclaim is viewed as
an original action, instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff and is tested by the
same tests and rules as a complaint."). Indeed, the character of a pleading "will be
determined by the court by the facts set out
in the pleading." Harman, 134 P.2d at 696;
see also For-Shor Co. v. Early, 828 P.2d
1080, 1084 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (treating
an action to intervene and foreclose a lien as
a complaint). Because a literal reading of
the term "complaint" would be "unreasonably
confusfing]" and render the statute "inoperable," Gillman, 2004 UT App 143 at 11 7, 91
P.3d 858 (quotations and citation omitted),
we hold that the term "complaint," as it is
used in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), includes counterclaims.
[5] 1114 Sill argues that section 38-1ll(4)(a) is a jurisdictional provision, and
therefore, Hart's failure to comply therewith
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear
Hart's lien foreclosure action. We recently
ruled that "failure to adhere to section 38-1ll(4)(a) [does] not divest the trial court of
jurisdiction." Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT
App 383,1115,121 P.3d 717.
1115 Instead, Hart's failure to comply with
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) "constitutes] an avoidance or affirmative defense" under rule 8(c)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah
R. Civ. P. 8(c). Although rule 8(c) does not
define or explain what constitutes an avoidance or an affirmative defense, "a rule 8(c)
affirmative defense is a defense employed to

defeat the plaintiffs claim by raising matters
outside or extrinsic to the plaintiffs prima
facie case." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins.
Co., 2002 UT 68,1131, 56 P.3d 524; see also
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v.
Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366,1374 (Utah 1996) ("A
rule 8(c) affirmative defense . . . raises matter outside the plaintiffs prima facie case."
(quotations and citation omitted)); Creekview
Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d
693, 695 (Utah CtApp.1989) (explaining that
avoidance under rule 8(c) is "a defense independent of the allegations in the pleadings").
Here, Hart's failure to comply with the requirements of section 38-l-ll(4)(a) constitutes an affirmative defense by Sill, in that it
suggests that Hart's mechanics' lien claim is
invalid for reasons outside and independent
of the allegations in Hart's counterclaim.
U 16 Although it appears from the record
that Sill did not raise the affirmative defense
until one week prior to trial and never made
a motion to amend his prior pleadings to
include the affirmative defense, the trial
court made no findings whatsoever regarding
these matters, the effect thereof, or the effect of the parties' stipulation thereon. Further, it is unclear from the record whether
Hart ever served Sill with the instructions
and form affidavit and motion for summary
judgment required by section 38-1-1 l(4)(a).
CONCLUSION
1117 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the trial court's award of prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and court costs in favor of
Hart, and remand for further proceedings
regarding Sill's affirmative defense in accordance with this opinion. The parties are to
bear their own attorney fees and court costs
on appeal.
1118 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T.
GREENWOOD and WILLIAM A.
THORNE JR., Judges.
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Joel Sill,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 20050245-CA
Bill Hart dba Hart
Construction,
Defendant and Appellee.

This matter is before the court upon Appellee's petition for
rehearing filed December 29, 2005.
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for
rehearing is denied.
Dated this
FOR THEICOURT:

d a y of J a n u a r y ,

2006

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
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In the Third Judicial District Court
Summit County, State of Utah
JOEL SILL,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
BILL HART, d/b/a HART
CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff,

Case No, 020500012
Hon. Deno G. Himonas

vs.
KALLIE J. SILL and DOES I-X,
Third-Party Defendants.
From October 13-22, 2004, Defendant and Counterclaimant, Bill Hart d/b/a Bill Hart
Construction ("Hart"), and Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, Joel Sill ("Sill"), tried this matter
to a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in Hart's favor of $314,500.00
on his unjust enrichment and mechanics.' lien claims.
Hart now seeks to reduce the verdict to a judgment. To this end, Hart has filed a Motion for
Entry of Judgment Upon a Verdict and for Decree of Foreclosure, Award of Prejudgment Interest,
Attorney's Fees and Costs (the "Motion"). Sill opposes the Motion on the grounds that (1) "Hart's
lien action is barred" because "Hart failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001)
when he served his counterclaim complaint on Sill;"1 (2) Hart is not entitled to prejudgment interest
and attorney's fees on his unjust enrichment claim; and (3) "Hart is entitled to only a portion of the
costs he claims." Response to Motion, pp. 3 & 8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court is of
the view that Hart's lien claim is valid and that he is entitled to prejudgment interest and attorney's
fees as a result. The Court is also of the view that Hart is entitled to a large part of his costs.

]

By stipulation the parties reserved for "post-verdict determination ... [a]ny issues concerning
Hart's compliance with the statutory requirements for maintaining and enforcing a mechanic's lien."
Response to Motion for Entry of Judgment Upon Verdict and for Decree of Foreclosure, Award of
Prejudgment Interest, Attorney's Fees and Costs ("Response to Motion"), p. 2 (citation and internal
quotations omitted).

ANALYSIS
Sill concedes that Hart is entitled to a judgment of $314,500.00 "for his unjust enrichment
claim." Response to Motion, p. 2. He contests, however, Hart's entitlement to a judgment on his
mechanics' lien claim. The nub of Sill's argument is that when Hartfiledhis counterclaim, he failed
to comply with the notice requirements set forth in Section 11(4) of Utah's mechanics' lien statute
(Title 38, Chapter 1), which provides in pertinent part as follows:
(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under
this chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102,
the lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on
the owner of the residence: (i) instructions to the owner of the
residence relating to the owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 11,
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and (ii) a
form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner
of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner may
exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.
(b) The lien claimant may file a notice to submit for decision on the
motion for summary judgment. The motion may be ruled upon after
the service of the summons and complaint upon the nonpaying party,
as defined in Section 38-11 -102, and the time for the nonpaying party
to respond,..., has elapsed.
* * *

(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien
claimant shall be barredfrommaintaining or enforcing the lien upon
the residence.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4) (2001)(emphasis added).2 Specifically, Sill argues that Hart never
served him with the instructions and "form affidavit and motion for summary judgment" identified
in Subsection (4)(a) when hefiledhis counterclaim. He further argues that this failure dooms Hart's
request for prejudgment interest and attorney's fees because Hart is only entitled to the same if he
prevails on his lien claim.
Hart readily admits that he did not serve the papers referenced above on Sill. He also readily
admits that he is not entitled to recover either prejudgment interest or attorney's fees on his unjust
enrichment claim. See, e.g., Motion, pp. 8 & 10-13. But he vigorously disputes the notion that
Subsection (4) applies to this dispute.

2

The parties are in agreement that the mechanics' lien statute in place when I fart filed his
counterclaim (February 2002) governs this dispute. See, e.g., Response to Motion, p. 3 n.l.
2

Both parties acknowledge that Subsection (4) is essentially dispositive of this issue and,
therefore, contend that the Subsection's plain and unambiguous language requires the Court to rule
in their favor. According to Sill, Hart's filing of his counterclaim constituted "fil[ing] an action to
enforce a lien" and triggered the notice obligations set forth in Subsection (4). Not so, according to
Hart; Subsection (4) applies, he asserts, only if a lien claimant "files an action" and serves a
"complaint" (versus a counterclaim) on a homeowner. Hart is correct.
"[W]hen interpreting a statute," a court "looks first to the statute's plain language to
determine" legislative intent. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, \ 17, 66 P.3d 592 (citation omitted).
In doing so, it must "read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related statutes." Id. (citations omitted). And
where the statute is clear, the court must not "assess the wisdom of the legislation," but must
"implement the law as it reads unless it results in an absurd outcome." Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952
P.2d 577, 586 (Utah App. 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
The plain language of Subsection (4) compels the conclusion that the Utah"Legislature
limited the obligation of a lien claimant to serve a homeowner with the materials referenced in
Subsection (4)(a) to those instances in which the lien claimant was initiating an action through
service of a complaint and not a counterclaim. First, while "[t]he word 'action' without more is
arguably broad enough to encompass any type of judicial proceeding, including counterclaims"
(Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers'Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73,81 (2nd Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted)), read in the context of Subsection (4), it is qualified by the reference to "service of the
complaint."3 Second, this reference to a complaint is to a pleading that is filed at the commencement
of a lawsuit and that is commonly understood to be distinct from a counterclaim. See, e.g., Local
Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d at 82; see also Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 3 ("A civil action is commenced (1) by filing of a complaint..., or (2) by service of a
summons together with a copy of the complaint") & 7(a) (distinguishing a complaint from other
pleadings). Third, had the Legislature intended Sill's construction, it could have easily provided for
it (e.g., by substituting the words "initial pleading" for "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a)).4

3

Sill argues that the Utah Court of Appeals disposed of this issue in his favor in American Rural
Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah App. 1997), when it held that the
word "action" in Section 38-1-18 of the mechanics' lien statute included a counterclaim. Id., p. 193.
Sill's reading ignores that there are no words or phrases in Section 18 that restrict the word "action" in
any way. Indeed, the current statute references "any action." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). Sill also
ignores that the American Rural Cellular decision is in harmony with the purpose of the mechanics' lien
statute, while his suggested interpretation is not. Infra, pp. 4-5; American Rural Cell, 939 P.2d at 193.
4

Sill counters that the reference to a "summons and complaint" in Subsection (4)(b) is proof that
the Legislature intended the reference to a "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) be broadly construed. Sill's
conclusion just does not follow. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party may not move for
summary judgment until "the expiration of 20 days from commencement of the action." Subsection 4(b)
simply makes clear that the motion for summary judgment identified in Subsection (4)(a) is not subject to
the same restraint.

3

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, is instructive. There, the Second Circuit was confronted with the
question of whether the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA") barred an
employee's counterclaim because it was financed by an "interested employer." Under Section
101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, an employee could not "institute an action" that was financed by an
"interested employer." Therefore, the union argued, Pelella could not maintain his employer-backed
counterclaim. The Second Circuit, relying heavily on a decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, disagreed. In doing so it noted that:
[A] defendant does not "institute" an action when he asserts a
counterclaim. Rather, a plaintiff must commence the action by filing
a complaint that names a defendant. This affords the defendant the
ability to file a responsive pleading, namely the answer,..., in which
he can include a claim for relief against the opposing party.
Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7, 350 F.3d at 82. The Second Circuit further noted
that this "narrow construction" better comported with legislative purpose, and that the "concerns"
that Section 101(a)(4) "seeks to address" were lessened because, "P}]y taking the member to court,
the union itself introduces the outside actor into what once had been an internal grievance and opens
the door to some measure of interference." Id, pp. 84-85.5
Sill counters that in Harmon v. Yeagar Et Ux., 134 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1943), the Utah
Supreme Court wrote that "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an original action . . . tested by the same
tests and rules as a complaint." He further counters that Black's Law Dictionary defines "complaint"
to include a counterclaim.6 While these arguments are not without some persuasive value, they do
not carry the day. Moreover, accepting these arguments would only create an ambiguity-an
ambiguity that must be resolved in favor of Hart's construction.
To the extent that a statute is ambiguous, it is appropriate for a court to look beyond its
language and to its legislative history7 and purpose. See Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d
480, 482 (Utah 1980) (citation omitted); State v. Burgess-Benyon, 2004 UT App 312, f 7, 99 P.3d
383 (citation omitted). With respect to the statute at hand, it is well established that its general
purpose is "to provide protection to those who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor
or materials." AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Development and Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289,
5

In a similar fashion, the concerns that Subsection (4) guards against are lessened when the
homeowner has demonstrated a certain familiarity with the legal process by instituting suit against a lien
claimant.
6

This is a secondary definition. The primary definition, at least according to Black's Law
Dictionary, is "[t]he original or initial pleading by which an action is commenced."
7

Because neither party addressed the legislative history of Subsection (4), the Court assumes that
it is either nonexistent or unhelpful.
4

291 (Utah 1986); see also Butter field Lumbar, Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Assoc, 815 P.2d 1330,
1334 (Utah 1991).8 That purpose is served by construing Subsection (4) narrowly and consistent
with its plain language, as Hart urges.9
Finally, the Court rejects Sill's alternative challenge to Hart's entitlement to prejudgment
interest and awards Hart the same on his mechanics' lien claim. The Court also awards Hart
attorney's fees (as prayed for and established by affidavit) and costs of suit (as described by the
Court at the January 31, 2005 hearing).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Motion in part and denies it in part. Counsel
for Hart is to prepare, circulate, and submit a Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision.
Dated this _~L_frclay of February, 2005, in Summit County, State of Utah.
BY THECOURT

DENO G. HIIVTON^B
r ...
DISTRICT COURT J U D G E ^ ^ '

8

It is important to note that "[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is
animated by one general purpose and intent." Miller, 2003 UT at Tf 17 (emphasis added) (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
9

Sill admits that he was not eligible for relief under the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien
Recovery Fund Act. Nevertheless, he urges the Court to adopt an interpretation that would restrict Hart's
ability to recover for an otherwise valid lien based on Hart's failure to provide notice of an irrelevant
statutory provision. While this point is certainly not dispositive, it does help emphasize that Sill's
construction is contrary to the lien law's overarching purpose.
5
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOEL SILL,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER AND
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE

vs.
BILL HART, d/b/a HART CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant/Counterclaimant,
Civil No. 020500012
BILL HART, d/b/a HART CONSTRUCTION,
Judge Deno G. Himonas
Third Party Plaintiff,
v.
KALLIE J. SILL, and DOES I-X,
Third Party Defendants.

u

The Jury having rendered its verdict in this action on October 22, 2004, and the court
having flilly considered Defendant, Counterclaimant and Third Party Plaintiff Bill Hart's Motion
for Entry of Judgment Upon a Verdict and For Decree of Foreclosure, Award of Prejudgment
Interest, Attorneys Fees and Costs, three supporting joint affidavits in support of motion for
award of attorneys fees, Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, and the related motion
papers, and having fully considered Plaintiffs opposing memoranda, and having heard oral
argument from Plaintiffs and Defendant's respective counsel on January 31, 2005, and being
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters judgment consistent with the court's
Memorandum Decision entered February 4, 2005.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED AND DECLARED
as follows:
1.

Bill Hart is awarded judgment in his favor and against Joel Sill, whose address is

28 White Pine Canyon Road, Park City, Utah 84060, in the amount of $314,500, plus
prejudgment interest of $98,480.88, plus costs of $5,598.92, plus reasonable attorneys fees in the
amount of $199,225.75, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, which are taxed as costs in this
matter, for a total judgment of $617,805.55.
2.

This judgment shall bear interest from entry hereof at the post-judgment rate

specified in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(3).
3.

The Notice of Lien dated January 30, 2002, recorded on January 31, 2002, as

Entry 00609900, in Book 1432, Page 511-512, of the official records of the Summit County
Recorder, is a valid and enforceable lien against the property located in Summit County, State of

Utah, described as follows (the "Property"), and Defendant Bill Hart is entitled to a foreclosure
of his lien on the Property:
All of Homestead No. 15, The Colony At White Pine Canyon, Phase 1
Amended Final Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on
file and of record in the office of the Summit County Recorder.
Also together with and subject to all rights, benefits, encumbrances
and obligations set forth in the grant of easements recorded September
28, 1998 as Entry No. 518627 in Book 1186 at Page 128 of the official
records.
Parcel #CWPC-15-AM
4.

The Property is hereby foreclosed pursuant to Defendant's lien, and the Property,

or such amounts as may be sufficient to pay the amounts due under this judgment and decree,
together with accruing costs and interest, be sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit
County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by Utah law for the sale of real property as in
the case of foreclosure of mortgages. Plaintiff Joel Sill, and Third Party Defendants, including
Kallie J. Sill, and each of them, and all persons and entities claiming by, through or under them
or any of them, have no further estate, right, title, lien, or other interest of any kind in, on, or to
the Property, except a right of redemption as the case may be as provided by law. Provided,
however, that the Property be foreclosed and sold subject to any unnamed, non-party person or
entity that holds any mortgage or interest that is prior to the interests of Defendant. Any party to
this action may bid for the Property at the sale.
5.

That all persons claiming under Plaintiff Joel Sill or Third Party Defendant Kallie

Sill, whose interests do not appear of record in the Summit County Recorder's Office as of

Defendant's filing of the lis pendens of this action, are barred and foreclosed of all right, title,
interest and equity of redemption in the Property.
6.

The Sheriff, upon sale of the Property, shall distribute the proceeds from the sale

as follows:
a. to pay the Sheriffs cost of sale, disbursements and commissions;
b. to pay to Bill Hart or his attorneys the accrued and accruing costs and
attorneys fees of this action, together with the remaining amounts owing Bill Hart for the
total judgment as set forth in paragraph 1 above;
c. any surplus after payment of the amount set forth above be accounted for and
paid over by the Sheriff to the Clerk of Court pending further order by this Court.
7.

The person or entity purchasing the Property at the sheriffs sale thereof shall

receive a Certificate of Sale from the sheriff and shall, subject to the rights of redemption, be
entitled to immediate possession of the Property and the right to receive and collect all rents
therefrom.
8.

After the time allowed by law for redemption has expired, the Sheriff shall

execute and deliver a Sheriffs Deed (the "Deed") to the purchaser at the sheriffs sale or the
person entitled thereto, as provided for by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The grantee named
therein shall thereupon be entitled to and have possession of the Property.
9.

Defendant Bill Hart is hereby awarded a deficiency judgment against Plaintiff

Joel Sill for any and all deficiencies remaining due after applying the net proceeds derived from
the foreclosure sale of the Property to the judgment as herein provided.

10.

This judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys

fees incurred by Defendant Bill Hart in collecting this judgment, by execution or otherwise, as
shall be established by affidavit.
DATED this

fHtey

of

Jjgfr

Third Distric
.-'•••. ^ >

Approved as to form:

T&toifl.
Christina I. Miller, Esq.
David B. Thompson, Esq.
Miller, Vance & Thompson, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Joel Sill

s.
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq.
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C.
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant Kallie J. Sill

